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Abstract:
Neuroeconomics – the study of brain activity in people engaged in tasks of
reasoning and choice – looks set to be the next behavioral economics: a set of findings
about how people make decisions that casts doubt on widely accepted premises about
rationality and social life. This essay explains what is most exciting about the new field
and lays out some specific research tasks for it.
By enabling researchers to view the mind at work, neuroeconomics puts in
question the most basic premise of twentieth-century empiricism, sometimes called
positivism or behaviorism: that people are black boxes to one another, and scientific
social inquiry must observe only their objective behavior, what they say and do. This
premise came to the center of neoclassical economic method via the 1930s work of the
hugely important economist Lionel Robbins, and it occasioned a methodological split in
social inquiry. Positivists (most importantly, economists) follow the strictures of
studying observable behavior, while interpretivists insist that we cannot understand social
life without interpreting the minds and intentions of others, even though we cannot view
them directly.
The limits of these two methods have restricted progress in understanding three
critical issues for legal scholarship: how people solve collective-action problems, why
some people are more susceptible than others to extremist political appeals, and whether
“commodification” creates a conflict between economic rationality and other values. I
show how the progress already made in neuroeconomics could make each of these
questions more answerable than it has recently seemed, with potentially significant
payoffs.
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What is the promise of neuroeconomics? This nascent field has converted a few
laboratory results into great excitement.1 Using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
technology, neuroscientists observe blood flow in the brains of people engaged in
familiar tasks of reasoning and choice. The results, while few and crude, already suggest
a lot about which regions of the brain engage in which dimensions of reasoning, choice,
and moral judgment. Like alchemists who dreamed of finding an elixir of life and
mystics who labored to see the face of God, investigators speak of “seeing utility.”2
What we have seen only in a mirror darkly, we might now meet vividly and immediately.
And in an age when economics has vast reach and authority both in the academy and in
the larger culture, the analogy to encountering life’s essence or God’s person might not
be altogether far-fetched. For the first time, we could unveil and examine the hidden
logic of our lives. This is the promise.
There is a deflationist response, which sees neuroeconomics as the false promise
of an academic culture too enamored of laboratory science and ephemeral trends.3 Even
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See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
405, 424 (2005) (identifying neuroeconomics as part of a cluster of rapidly advancing inquiries in the
biology of human behavior that might significantly change our estimation of how law interacts with
individuals’ reasoning and decisions); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral
Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 637, 715 n. 179 (2005)
(noting that neuroeconomics promises to “reduce the guesswork” about the effects of incentives on
decision-making that been so important to shaping corporate governance); William Bradford, In the Minds
of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1243, 1420-21 (2004) (arguing
that advances in neuroeconomics may make possible the explanation and prediction of compliance with
and violations of the international humanitarian law); Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy:
Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV 105, 129-30 (2004) (arguing that
neuroeconomics’ revelation of the limits of the rational-actor model of human behavior can improve
franchise regulation); Sandra Blakeslee, Brain Experts Now Follow the Money, N.Y. TIMES at F1 (June
17, 2003) (noting the growing importance of neural imaging in research into behavioral economics).
2
Presentation of Colin Camerer, Duke University, Dec. 8 2005.
3
See, e.g., Terence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1325, 1237-38 (2005) (noting the argument that neural correlates of already observable behavior give us no
information that we do not already have).
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at its most sophisticated, brain imaging can only give us a map of correlations, physical
events in the brain that correspond to the activity of the mind. But neoclassical
economics rests on the axiom that utility functions reveal themselves through actual
choice – revealed preference – and thus that utility maximization literally just is what we
do. Thus it gains nothing from peeking into the black box of the brain. As for the
heterodox proposals of behavioral economics, with its observations about systematic nonmaximizing behavior, there too investigators are concerned with the observable behavior
of human beings, with their implication for the design of institutions and the achievement
of cooperation. Correlations add little or nothing.
In this Essay, I argue that the promise of neuroeconomics is considerable – even
greater, in fact, than the claims its advocates have made for it. To understand why this is
so, it is necessary to address a basic methodological division in law and social science.
For much of the last century, social inquiry, including legal inquiry, has been marked by
a schism between two methodological schools, neither capable of giving a fully
satisfactory account of social life. One camp, which we might call positivist, takes
observation, prediction, and, ultimately, falsifiability as the elements of its gold standard.
The other, the interpretivist camp, insists that these criteria misapprehend the nature of
human activity – both individual action and social life – because whatever people do,
they do as self-conscious and self-interpreting actors. On this account, giving a
description of human activity that omits the pervasive and perennial activity of
interpretation is like dancing about architecture: it is a category mistake. Whoever makes
the mistake of trying to describe human activity in positivist terms ensures that the
vocabulary of his description cannot capture essential features of object being described.
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Neuroeconomics matters to this schism because the schism arose from a very
particular episode in the history of twentieth-century thought: a deep methodological
embarrassment about the invisibility of any mind to any other mind. In this view, we are
black boxes to one another, knowable only through observable behavior that may or may
not correspond to any particular internal state. Even the conviction that others have
internal states like those we experience in ourselves, rather than something completely
different, is a point of faith rather than knowledge. As I will show later, this difficulty
motivated the shift to the methodology of contemporary microeconomics and
economically informed social inquiry. The promise of neuroeconomics is to bring other
minds one giant step nearer visibility. The effect of this change would be to soften the
methodological opposition between positivist prediction and falsification on the one hand
and interpretativist effort on the other.
Diminishing the methodological opposition matters because the respective limits
of the two approaches have rendered intractable questions of absolutely first importance
for legal scholars. Problems about what people value and how, how and why we
overcome collective-action problems, and the social-psychological bases of liberalism
and authoritarianism have suffered from division between the two camps, neither of
which can do them justice. Positivist approaches beg the most important question: why
people act as they do. Without this, every “explanation” is just a correlation.
Interpretivism, for its part, carries the cardinal sin of being non-falsifiable: as its most
candid practitioners concede, the hermeneutic circle really is closed.
In Part I of this Essay, I survey the most provocative findings of neuroeconomics
and the closely allied inquiry into the neurology of moral reasoning. I then present the
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competing claims that scholars have made for the relevance of this work to law and social
inquiry. In Part II, I set the rise of neuroeconomics in the context of the twentiethcentury methodological split between positivism and interpretivisim, showing how the
invisibility of other minds drove the schism. In Part III, I present several very important
problems that the schismatic methods have followed into culs- de-sac, and suggest how
even a moderately successful neuroeconomics could aid a fruitful rapprochement. I
argue that the kind of information that neuroeconomics provides cannot dissolve the
methodological opposition I have described, and that we should not wish otherwise, as
each methodological approach has value not reducible to the terms of the other.
Nonetheless, the modest rapprochement that neuroeconomics promises might be very
valuable. Part IV concludes.

I.

Neuroeconomics So Far

The tools of neuroeconomics are blunt enough that most findings involve a
simple, even inevitably simplistic, distinction between areas of the brain associated with
emotions and others associated with cognitive activity such as conscious memory and
calculation.4 The basic technique of MRI brain-scans is to measure the flow of blood to
various brain regions as subjects perform exercises in reasoning and choice. Findings are
4

See Jonathan D. Cohen, The Vulcanization of the Human Brain A Neural Perspective on Interactions
Between Cognition and Emotion, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES (No. 4) 3-10 (2005) (laying out this
methodological account). Because this essay is intended for legal scholars interested in the results of
neuroeconomic studies, and a fair amount of training in neurology would be necessary would be necessary
to assess researchers’ classifications of the various brain regions, I distinguish in the text of the essay
between “cognitive” and “emotional” regions. I do, however, note in footnotes which regions are under
examination in each study I summarize. Almost all studies identify the prefrontal cortex with reasoning
ability and cognitive control, that is, the ability to direct action in keeping with abstract commitments or
intentions, especially when this involves overriding intuitions or reflexes. See id. at 10. By contrast, a set
of subcortical structures, which evolved earlier and are located deeper in the brain, are thought to register
immediate emotional or visceral responses to events or circumstances, responses that are transmitted
directly to regions of the frontal cortical lobes: the amygdale, the medial and orbital regions of the frontal
cortex, and the insular cortex. See id. at 8-9.
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generally of this form: variations in the reasoning exercise correspond to changes in
relative activity among brain regions, suggesting that certain exercises invoke a greater
share of cognitive capacity while others invoke emotional responses in greater measure.5
These results tend to be most interesting in situations of a particular type: where theorists
have speculated that several reasoning tasks are indistinguishable as a matter of principle
(where the principle may be either self-interest maximization or some stipulated moral
rule), yet individuals actually engaged in the exercises reach different results across
tasks.6 The distribution of neural activity in each task tends to suggest something about
the character of divergence in actually observed reasoning across tasks.
Interpretation of these results generally relies on a model of brain activity in
which conscious processing is regarded as a relatively scarce resource, able to
concentrate on only one problem (or at most on a handful of problems) at a time, and thus
jealously husbanded.7 The model regards unconscious processing as relatively abundant,
able to receive, integrate, and evaluate a great deal of information simultaneously.8 Thus,
on this model, an efficient brain strives to convert conscious processing to unconscious
processing by, in effect, generating unconscious programs to handle information and
navigate circumstances that would otherwise require conscious processing.9 Learning to
ride a bicycle or drive a car provides a simple example: at first the activity requires most
of the mind’s available conscious attention; soon enough, though, it recedes to the
“background” of unconscious processing, and one can work out a dinner menu or a math
problem, have a phone conversation, or compose a sonnet while riding or driving.
5

See id. at 4-6.
I discuss several finds of this sort in I.A-B, below.
7
See Cohen, supra n. 5 at 4-6.
8
See id.
9
See id.
6
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Without hazarding complex hypotheses in evolutionary or psychodynamic psychology,
neurological researchers often suppose that emotional responses express unconscious
processing, developed either genetically or in individual maturation, while cognitive
reasoning makes greater demands on conscious processing.10

A. Moral Reasoning
The “trolley problem,” much discussed by Judith Jarvis Thomson, is a modern
classic in the minor genre of moral philosophy dilemmas.11 The problem is to generate a
moral principle that accounts for widely held intuitions about two hypothetical decisions.
Both decisions have the same formal stricture: whether to sacrifice one life to preserve a
larger number of lives. Yet depending how the decision is structured, people persistently
come to very different conclusions. Hence the difficulty: is moral reasoning principled at
all, or is it just dressed-up ad-hockery?
The first version of the decision is the simplest. The subject is asked to imagine
herself the switchperson on a railroad. As a train approaches, she realizes that five
people stand on the track, and that she has no way to warn them. All she can do to avert
their deaths is to throw the switch and divert the train to a side-track – where,
unfortunately, a single person is standing. Most subjects agree that it is appropriate – a
word eliding the difference between “permissible” and “required” to throw the switch.
This suggests utilitarian reasoning: other things equal, the greatest aggregate good is
served by preserving five lives, even at the cost of one.
10

See id.
See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS,
RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 78-93 (1986); THOMSON, The Trolley
Problem, in id. at 94-116. The problem was originally formulated by Philippa Foot. See Philippa Foot,
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. (1967).
11
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Now change the problem. Suppose there is no chance to switch the train to a
second track. Instead, as the train barrels toward the five innocents, the subject is to
imagine herself standing on a footbridge over the track. (This is sometimes called the
“footbridge problem,” for the sake of keeping track. Pun inadvertent.) She is standing
next to an enormously large person. (Readers will have their own favorites, perhaps
ranging on partisan grounds from Arnold Schwarzenegger to Ted Kennedy.) If she
pushes her companion onto the track, his weight will stop the train. She is herself too
slight to make the difference, even if she were inclined to self-sacrifice.
Formally speaking, the footbridge problem appears identical to the original trolley
problem: Do you take an action that will result in one death but save five lives? Yet
many subjects who approved of the action in the first problem now find it inappropriate.
The minority who stick to their utilitarianism tend to hesitate and waver before overriding
a deep reluctance to push, which they did not feel, at least not in the same degree, when
choosing the utility-maximizing action meant pulling the switch.
How, then, to reconcile the two sets of responses under a single principle? Does
the ambition even make sense? One effort involves suggesting, on loosely Kantian
grounds, that the difference is in using another as a means to an end: in the footbridge
problem, sacrificing one’s large companion is instrumentally necessary to saving the five
others, while in the trolley problem, the death of the one is incidental to the act of saving
the five. Inconveniently, however, a simple change in the facts of the trolley problem
spoils the Kantian hypothesis. Suppose the side-track is a loop that rejoins the main track
just before the place where the five are standing, but that there is a large person on the
side-track whose bulk will be enough to stop the train. Now, throwing the switch to
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move the train will still save the five, but the death of the one is instrumentally necessary.
Yet most subjects now move back to a utilitarian judgment, and say throwing the switch
is appropriate.
The search for a unifying principle seems lost. We are free to say, of course, that
people are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; everything said so far is description,
not prescription. What, though, can we say about the way moral reasoning proceeds?
That we accept utilitarianism up to the point of a switch, but not to the point of a shove?
If so, how should we understand the difference?
After decades of discussion that circled these problems, a group of neuroscientists
devised an experiment effectively testing the “switch v. shove” account. They presented
subjects with a battery of 60 hypothetical decisions, codes into three categories: (1) “upclose and personal” moral decisions involving relatively intimate actions, including a
version of the footbridge problem, a case of harvesting one living person’s organs
involuntarily to save five others, and a case of throwing people off an overcrowded
lifeboat; (2) impersonal moral problems, including a version of the trolley problem and a
case of voting for a policy that would cause more deaths than the alternative; and (3) nonmoral decisions, such as whether to take a train or a bus given certain time constraints.12
The moral-personal problems were associated with increases in MRI signal of between
20% and 40% in brain areas associated with emotion; by contrast, none of these areas
experienced as much as a 20% increase while subjects addressed the impersonal moral
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See Joshua D. Greene, et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293
2105, 2107 (Sept. 14, 2001). The areas of the brain coded for cognitive activity in this experiment
were the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the left and right anterior gryi. The middle
frontal gyrus and the left and right parietal lobes were associated with cognitive activity and control, i.e.,
the self-conscious governance of moral judgment by abstract principles.
SCIENCE
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problems, and for two of the four areas the increase was below 10%.13 The areas
associated with cognitive processing, however, showed increases of 15%-25% during the
impersonal moral problems, and much lower, or even declining activity for the personal
moral problems.14 Non-moral problems were associated with small increases or even
decreases in activity in areas associated with emotion, and increases rivaling and
sometimes surpassing those of impersonal moral problems in areas associated with
cognitive processing.15 The results suggested that problems involving direct injury to
another person invoke more or less automatic, emotional responses of aversion, which are
usually powerful enough to pre-empt consciously held contrary principles.16 Problems
that did not invoke these responses appeared to engage a different system, a body of
utilitarian principles associated with cognitive processing.17 Thus “moral reasoning”
appeared to be divided among two broad systems of cognition, which responded to
different features of a problem according to different criteria and thus produced
incompatible results.
The researchers advanced the experiment in a later version, in which they sought
to understand relations among the competing systems of moral response.18 This time,
their key distinction was between “easy personal” judgments and “hard personal”
judgments. Both categories proposed tradeoffs between one life and benefits to others
and asked the subject to imagine taking the life at close range. The exemplary “easy
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See id. at 2106.
See id.
15
See id.
16
See id. at 2107.
17
See id.
18
See Joshua D. Greene, et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 44
NEURON 389-400 (Oct. 14, 2004). The region of the brain associated with cognitive activity and control
was the anterior cingulated cortex, while emotional responses were associated with the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex region. See id. at 390.
14
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personal” case, which they called “infanticide,” asked the subject to consider killing an
unwanted newborn. The exemplary “hard personal” case presented a decision whether to
smother a crying infant to prevent enemy soldiers from discovering and murdering an
entire family – including the infant.19 The ambition of the experiment was to observe
brain activity as two types of response – emotional aversion and utilitarian cognition –
came into contest. They found first that difficult judgments – measured by the time
subjects took to make their decisions, which corresponded fairly closely to researchers’
conception of the questions as easy or difficult – corresponded to increased activity in
brain regions associated with mediating conflict among responses and enforcing
cognitive control over emotional impulses.20 Second, they found that subjects who
reached a utilitarian judgment about the crying baby case – who, in other words, overrode
strong emotional aversion with principle – showed higher levels of activity in the
cognitive-control regions than those who finally declared it inappropriate to smother the
child.21 In other words, the more conflict between emotion and principle, the more
cognitive activity; and cognitive activity rises to an even higher level when abstract
principle overrides emotional response.22
Even taken in a charitable spirit, this research raises many more questions than it
answers. The categories of “emotion” and “cognition” are diffuse and have uncertain
boundaries, not least vis-à-vis each other. Utilitarian reasoning, for instance, presupposes
a judgment about who counts as a member of the relevant moral community – a question
19

See id. at 394-96.
See id. at 397.
21
See id.
22
Interestingly, the judgment in favor of smothering the crying baby is also associated with increased
activity in one region associated with emotion. Greene and his colleagues suggest, following David Hume,
that this region may be associated with an emotional motivation to cognitive activity, perhaps a
commitment to principle or a benevolent attitude toward humanity.
20
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fought in the nineteenth century over race and class, and in the twenty- first over nonhuman species. In one of the classic American comments on race and moral blindness,
Mark Twain had Huckleberry Finn declare that a steam-engine explosion had hurt
nobody – only “killed a nigger.” 23 Is the judgment underlying that statement cognitive or
emotional? What about the change in ideas and sentiments that produces my reaction as I
look at the phrase I have just typed: intense emotional discomfort at a word that carries
the ugliest associations, combined with a principled belief that a modestly unsettling
example is the best way to communicate the force of the question? What systems would
be engaged by, for instance, a “principle” of emotional spontaneity – perhaps adopted by
someone who believed his ethical and interpersonal shortcoming resulted from an excess
of abstraction and lack of connection with his own feelings? The examples are easy to
multiply, and are not trivial: they lie near the heart of actual moral experience.
Nonetheless, even these relatively primitive findings are enormously provocative.
They call into question two fairly widespread ideas in moral psychology. One is the
cognitivist idea that moral reasoning is basically a matter of applying principles, and that
moral development occurs through movement from one principle to another.24 The other
is the anti-cognitivist idea that moral judgments are basically elements of perception –
that sensory information hits consciousness already interpreted as “good,” “bad,” and so
forth.25 The results surveyed here strongly suggest interaction between two sets of
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MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN XXX (XXXX).

24

This view is canonically associated with Lawrence Kohlberg’s account of moral reasoning as
culminating in the individual’s capacity to apply abstract principles of general reach to specific cases. See
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981).
25
A version of this view is sometimes associated with Martha Nussbaum’s early work, notably MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY
AND PHILOSOPHY 13-17, 40-43, 316-17 (1986) (describing this view). Nussbaum has continued to
take her inquiry into the relationship between reflective and unreflective, embedded and self-conscious, or
emotional and cognitive moral evaluation in interesting and productive directions. See NUSSBAUM,
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responses. One is emotionally powerful and largely pre-conscious in its evaluations, in
the manner envisaged in the anti-cognitivist position. The other, which comes into play
when the first system comes into conflict with explicit principle, seems to involve
conscious application of principle both to decision problems and to the emotions that
those problems evoke. The scenarios of the trolley problem, thus, do not display a single
system of reasoning, but rather engage two systems, often complementary, which come
into conflict as a series of hypothetical trains chug toward disaster.

B. Rationality and Reciprocity: Ultimatum Games and Other Decisions
The ultimatum game has been among the most productive experiments in
behavioral economics. The game involves two players and a pot of money. One player
proposes a division of the money, which the second player accepts or rejects. If the
second player accepts the division, then the players claim their respective shares of the
money. If the second player rejects the division, however, the pot of money “dissolves”
and neither player takes anything.
The game provides a clean test of a prediction of purely self-interested behavior.
According to that prediction, the first player should propose that the second take the
smallest divisible unit of money – a penny, let us say, or, if a penny is intuitively no
longer money at all these days, a nickel – because he will seek to maximize his gain from
the transaction. And the second player should accept the division, because any offer
above zero improves his position.

HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 21-70 (2004) (discussing the
interaction of emotional response and moral judgment).
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Offered the opportunity to demonstrate self-interested rationality, test subjects
demurred. Student players’ modal offer is almost always 50% of the pot, and mean
offers are between 40% and 45%.26 Respondents are not much more conventionally
rational than offerors: when the offer falls below 20%, they reject it about half the time.27
Skeptics suggested that the stakes of the game were too low to engage fully rational
behavior, and that players misunderstood the one-off character of the transaction and
imagined they were establishing reputations for selfishness or generosity; but
experiments with higher stakes (up to a $400 pot) and with opportunities to learn and
appreciate the rules of the game yielded much the same results.28
The ultimatum game has benefited from one of the first major cross-cultural
experiments in behavioral economics. When students around the world turned up pretty
much the same lab results, researchers took the ultimatum game to 15 herding, huntergatherer, and slash-and-burn agricultural societies in Asia, Africa, and South America.29
Mean offers ran as high as 57% among the Lamalera, a Malaysian island people, and as
low as 25% among the Quichua, semi-nomadic horticulturalists in South America. The
Tsimane of Bolivia rejected not one of seventy offers, including five offers of below
20%. The Machiguenga of Peru, who live semi-nomadically in the tropical forests of the
Amazon, most closely approximated the neoclassical model of self-interested behavior:
almost half their offers were below 20%, and of those only one was rejected.30

26

See Joseph Henrich, et al. “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15
small-scale societies at secs. 1-2 (forthcoming BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES).
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See Table 2 in Henrich, et al.
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The persistent results of student ultimatum games inspired a functional
explanation: that societies do better when their members are motivated to behave
reciprocally and to punish non-reciprocal behavior.31 Results from the intercultural
ultimatum game experiments enriched the interpretive effort. To begin with, offers were
generally too high to be consistent with a context-adjusted version of self-interest, in
which players would be predicted to make offers that maximized expected income given
relevant rejection thresholds.32 Second, higher offers were significantly correlated with
what the researchers called “payoff to cooperation” in economic life, that is, how much
economic well-being depends on actors outside the household.33 Higher offers were also
positively correlated with the social groups’ degree of market integration, that is, how
frequently members engaged in market transactions.34 The interpretation these results
suggest, then, is that ideas of fairness and reciprocity matter everywhere, and modify the
neoclassical supposition that individuals will act solely to maximize their own selfinterest. But reciprocity and fairness appear to be variable, not fixed, both in their hold
on individuals and, particularly, in their content across cultures. Moreover, day-to-day
experience of reciprocity as integral to social life, whether through cooperation or
through market transactions, appears, as first look, to train people in reciprocal
behavior.35 The results are compatible with the general interpretation of reciprocity as

31

See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism, 425 NATURE 785-91 (2003).
See Henrich, et al., at sec. 4.2.
33
See id. at sec. 5.
34
See id.
35
This argument about market psychology is classically captured in one of Adam Smith’s lesser-known
arguments:
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality
offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is in his interest. Men always
endeavour to persuade others to be of their opinion even when the matter is of no consequence to
them. … And in this manner, every one is practising oratory on others thro the whole of his
life.—You are uneasy whenever one differs from you, and you endeavour to persuade [him] to be
32
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evolutionarily adaptive, but maintain considerable space for cultural plasticity and,
consequently, individual habituation into or against reciprocity.
How, then, to conceive of the relationship between self-interest and reciprocity as
elements of players’ reasoning in ultimatum games? Is reciprocity an abstract normative
principle akin to utilitarian reasoning, a reflective override of simple selfishness that
takes into account the overall functional benefit of rewarding cooperative behavior and
punishing defecting behavior? Does rational self-interest operate like a meticulous
calculator of benefits and burdens, or like a hungry child reaching spontaneously for what
most pleases it? Is the relationship between the two “principles” an integrated one, as
philosophers hoped that the “principle” behind the trolley problem would be, or is, as
neuroimaging studies suggest, a contest between distinct aspects of motivation and
judgment?
A group of Princeton researchers addressed a part of this question by measuring
the neural activity of respondents in an ultimatum game.36 Researchers told respondents
that some of their offers would come from living offerors, whom respondents briefly met
before the game began, while other offers were generated by a computer.37 In fact, the
researchers manipulated the offers to ensure consistent distribution of “fair” (50/50) and
of your mind … . In this manner [people] acquire a certain dexterity and adress [sic] in managing
their affairs, or in other words in managing of men … . That is bartering, by which they adress
[sic] themselves to the self interest of the person and seldom fail immediately to gain their end.
The brutes have no notion of this …
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 352 (R.L. Meek et al. ed.) (Oxford University Press 1978)
(1762-63). I have elaborated on the consequences of this argument in Jedediah Purdy, A FreedomPromoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 125158 (2005).
36

See Alan G. Sanfey, et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game, 300
1755-1758 (June 13, 2003). Researchers associated the bilateral anterior insula with negative
emotional states such as resentment and disgust, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex with cognitive activity
such as calculation, and the anterior cingulated cortex with cognitive conflict, i.e., a struggle to maintain
cognitive control in the face of a strong emotional response.
37
See id. ar 1756.
SCIENCE
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“unfair” (90/10 and 80/20) offers.38 Respondents accepted all 50/50 offers and nearly all
70/30 offers. Rejection rates, however, ranged between 15% and 60% for lower offers;
moreover, acceptance rates for computer-generated “unfair” offers were at least 20 points
higher than for “unfair” offers linked to a human offeror.39 These results suggest that the
motive to refuse offers perceived as unfair is linked to an idea about interpersonal
reciprocity, that is, that fairness is a matter of reciprocal relations between human beings,
and unfairness a willful withholding of that reciprocity.
The neural results of the study were particularly interesting. Unfair offers from
human partners were associated with elevated levels of activity in two areas of the brain.
One, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is associated with “cognitive processes
such as goal maintenance and executive control,” and was also associated with utilitarian
judgments in the moral reasoning studies.40 The other, the bilateral anterior insula (BAI),
is associated with “negative emotional states” such as anger and disgust, as well as with
sensations of hunger and thirst.41 Not only were both regions engaged by unfair offers
“from” human offerors; activity in the BAI was higher while considering offers that
respondents rejected than while considering offers they accepted.42 Moreover – although
the researchers caution against quick conclusions from comparisons of concurrent
activity in different areas of the brain – it appears that respondents reject offers when BAI
activity is greater than DLPFC activity, and vice-versa.43
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An unskeptical view of findings that are unavoidably crude suggests several
tentative judgments. First, the motive of reciprocity in rejecting unfair offers appears
linked with very basic experiences of affront and deprivation: hunger, thirst, repugnance,
all of which register as physical and emotional facts, not problems for deliberate
evaluation. Second, when confronted with unfairness, this motive appears to come into
direct conflict with a cognitive effort at maximizing self-interest even at the cost of
absorbing an insult. Under conditions of fairness, the two might easily work in harmony;
but as with the trolley problem, under circumstances that pull apart their cooperation, two
quite distinct modes of reasoning enter a struggle for dominance. Third – taking into
account cross-cultural findings in ultimatum-game experiments – the threshold of “insult”
that engages the BAI emotional response appears to vary with the principles of
reciprocity or non-reciprocity carried out in the everyday activity of the respondent’s
society. Moreover, it is plausible to suppose that economic maximizing is also socially
learned behavior, at least in some degree: the content of the DLPFC’s cognitive override
does not seem likely to be genetically programmed in its particulars, any more than a
gene is likely to turn up for classical utilitarianism, strict Kantianism, or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency. The overall impression, then, is of an uneasy relation between cognition and
emotion, in which the two are sometimes complementary, sometimes at odds, but
distinctly and essentially expressions of different types of neural activity.
Other neuroimaging results are also intriguing. In another finding connected
with reciprocity, researchers have found that areas of the brain associated with emotion
and social engagement are activated in people who achieve high levels of cooperation in
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repeated prisoners’ dilemma- type reciprocity games.44 These studies also show that
participants with high levels of cooperation show greater activity in the associated brain
areas when playing with other people than when playing with computers, while less
cooperative subjects register the same (relatively low) level of brain activity when
engaged in a cooperation game with a computer as when playing the same game with a
human being.45 The studies also show brain activity associated with receiving rewards or
pleasurable feedback activated in connection with human reciprocity (and suppressed
when the other player defects), and not reaching the same level when a computer’s
“reciprocity” produces the same monetary award that human reciprocity generated.46
Taken together, these results suggest that special satisfactions accompany reciprocity, but
that not all individuals experience these satisfactions equally, and that our social
functionality may vary our emotional response to reciprocity.
A small study with results published in 2002 suggested another intriguing
conclusion: that people making choices with a range of specified possible outcomes are
more averse to ambiguity (which characterizes a situation in which it is impossible to
calculate the respective odds of various outcomes) than to risk (in which the odds of
various outcomes are known).47 Experimental subjects confronted two urns containing
balls of three colors. After selecting one of the two urns, they received a cash reward
44
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depending on the color of a ball drawn at random from that urn. (In some rounds, they
instead selected an urn knowing that they would a cash withdrawal from an initial
endowment, also in an amount depending on the color of the ball drawn.) The balls in
one urn represented a wider variation in possible rewards or subtractions, while in the
other the balls were designated with a narrower range of cash consequences.
Subjects played two versions of the same game. In one, they knew the number of
balls of each color in each urn, and so were able to calculate the odds of each possible
outcome. This was thus a situation of risk. The odds were so designed that the expected
payoff from each urn was identical: therefore, the deciding factor in subjects’ choice was
their taste for the degree of risk, that is, for a lower chance of a higher payoff or the
reverse.48 In the other version, although the spread of possible results was known and
was the same as in the first, the numbers of balls of two of three colors were unknown for
the urn with the smaller spread. For the urn with the larger spread, all numbers remained
known: this urn was identical in every respect with the larger-spread urn in the first
version of the game. Thus, although participants knew the spread of possible results for
each urn, they could not know the odds of each result only for the higher-spread urn.
This was thus a situation of choice between risk and ambiguity. The experiment thus
measured the difference between preference for high-spread versus low
The experiment showed that participants were much more likely to choose the
lower-spread urn under conditions when facing ambiguity than under conditions of risk.
That is, participants were averse to ambiguity in itself, seeking to avoid exposure to
unknowable odds of either harm or benefit.49 Moreover, in subjects facing choices that
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presented ambiguity, brain activity was high in regions associated with emotional
response, while those making judgments wholly about risk showed activity concentrated
in regions associated with calculation and “executive processes.”50 The implication is
that risk engages a portion of the brain adapted to reasoning much like that modeled in
economic accounts of rationality, while ambiguity engages more basic responses to threat
or hazard – what the researchers define as “settings in which the competence of the
decision maker is challenged.”51 That is, what we do not feel we can know and control
may elicit decision-shaping responses that move us away from instrumental rationality in
the direction of a kind of self-protective crouch. One system, metaphorically speaking,
advances the interests of home economicus; the other protects the frightened animal.
Depending which system a situation engages, it is a very different actor that will respond.

C. Implications for Law?
Reception of neuroeconomics by economics-oriented legal scholars has been
instrumental, that is, interested in how neuroscience can help law to facilitate welfaremaximizing behavior.52 It has also tended to suffer from the problem of mere correlation.
The background argument is the widely recognized functional account of modern law as
facilitating transactions among strangers at great distances, separating economic life from
social and geographic proximity, which both facilitated and constrained it for many
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years.53 A major part of this institutional achievement is to generate impersonal
institutions that can substitute effectively for interpersonal trust.54 On this account, the
contribution of neuroeconomics is that economic self-interest and the reciprocity
characteristic of trust have different correlates in the brain, and may well express distinct
and potentially competing motivational systems. If this is true, then those who design
legal systems should be alert to both the benefits of consonance between the systems and
the hazards of bringing them into conflict, causing what one might think of as drag or
friction, an emotionally founded reluctance to participate in economically rationally,
impersonal transactions.55
This is not necessarily an empty contribution, but it flirts with the emptiness of
mere correlation. The problem is nicely, and inadvertently, captured in a passage from
Terrence Chorvat and Kevin McCabe’s argument to this effect: “If [government] can
frame violations of its rules as defections from social norms, they are more likely to be
punished and often private punishment is enough to enforce this obligation. To the extent
that society is able to frame defection as cheating and invoke social sanctions,
enforcement will become easier.”56 The difficulty is that, if social norms is synonymous
with whatever new information neuroeconomics has provided us, then there is no new
information at all, except a new layer of correlation. It is not news, after all – although it
raised some eyebrows among law-and-economics scholars in the previous decade – that
social norms make a difference in people’s decisions, that perceptions of “good” and
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“bad,” “fair,” and “unfair” matter to legal compliance.57 There has been a fair amount of
effort to specify the appropriate understanding of the relationship between law and
norms.58 There may be a time when neuroimaging reveals something non-obvious about
this relationship; but for now, to identify the contribution of neuroeconomics with the
contribution of norms theory is to invite the charge of correlation, and to have no answer.
Nonetheless, one sees what the efforts at application are getting at, and it is
potentially profound. We know that human beings act persistently against our interests –
individual and collective. Sometimes we are sub-optimal; at other times, we are
downright destructive, or worse, murderous. We know, moreover, that the worst things
we do often express motives that are not evil, not essentially aimed at waste or
destruction, but misplaced or misshapen. Fear is a valuable, even a necessary emotion;
but we fear things we should not, whether ambiguity or nuclear waste or Tutsis, and so
we make mistakes, or worse. A visceral reluctance to harm another human being may be
an essential check on brutality, but it may that when harming another will save hundreds,
our deepest moral intuition may be too strong, and lead us astray. In contrast, if we are
considering a political decision to launch cruise missiles at a city we have never seen and
whose residents we have never met, the same intuition may be too weak, and give too
much play to expedience and fear. Neuroeconomics promises a glimpse of the neural
systems where these intuitions, feelings, emotional and cognitive programs, operate. And
this, in turn, suggests that we could better understand why we do what we do, and how
we might improve. Is this right, or is it correlates all the way down?
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In the next Part, I propose that the feeling of promise attached to neuroeconomic
observations expresses frustration with a methodological divide characteristic of
twentieth-century social science, and that understanding the culs-de-sac where this divide
has led can help us to discern the most important questions where neuroeconomics can
make a contribution.

II.

Other Minds and the Great Divide

A. The Positivist Claim
It may seem odd, in an essay on the latest methodological advances in the human
sciences, to pause over the quaintly named philosophical “problem of other minds.”59
The problem with other minds, Anglo-American philosophers of the early twentieth
century concluded, is that they are inaccessible to us.60 We can make no direct
observation of the subjective experience of others, nor can we share in it ourselves. This
distinguishes others’ subjective experience from two domains that we do observe
directly: our own subjective experience, and external phenomena – that is, the world
outside us, except the bits of it contained with the minds of others.61 About our
observations of our own experience, we have a fair amount of confidence: I am happy, I
am in pain, I am fearful, I am elated – we observe these facts as directly as we observe
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anything.62 The same holds of our observations of external objects: she is dancing, he is
falling, they are on fire – unless our eyes are tricking us, we observe these things directly.
And such direct observation has implications for knowledge.63 Although it is possible to
stake out an epistemologically skeptical position and stick to it on principle, direct
observation is far and away the best candidate for knowledge: we know the things we
observe, or we know very little at all.64
Other minds are different. Here trouble begins. How do we know that others
have subjective experience like our own? When someone says, “I am in pain,” how do I
know that he means what I mean when I use that phrase? Or, perhaps more persuasively,
when he says, “I love her,” why should I believe that the experience behind the phrase is
same that I observe in myself when I reply, “No, I love her”? What do if we then insist,
simultaneously, “Well, she loves me”? All the evidence we have is words and actions.
We can suppose that they express the same inner states that we experience in ourselves;
but we cannot know.
It would entirely forgivable to feel that one had not caught the force of the
“problem” so far. Is this in fact a problem, except for severe neurotics?65 A little more
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historical texture may be of some help. The problem of other minds took wind to its sails
from Logical Positivism, a philosophical movement that flourished, particularly in
Austria and England, in the early decades of the twentieth century.66 The ambition of
Logical Positivism was to distinguish between propositions whose truth or falsehood
could be determined and others that lacked truth-value and were in fact expressed only
conceptual confusion or emotional assertion masquerading as something more.67 One
category of statements that notoriously lacked truth-value in the Logical Positivist view
was moral claims: good and bad, right and wrong, were dressed up assertions of
preference, and best treated as such.68 Another such category was statements involving
alleged facts about which, in principle, no reliable evidence could be obtained – such as
statements about the nature of God, or about other minds.69 Claims about the contents of
other people’s minds were exemplary of the kinds of confusion of prejudice or wishful
thinking with knowledge-claims that the Logical Positivists sought to banish from
respectable inquiry.70
As David Grewal has recently argued, the advent of the now-dominant economic
model of behavior was directly linked with the intellectual culture of Logical Positivism
in general, and with the problem of other minds in particular. Lionel Robbins, the
English economist who contributed much to bringing about the so-called ordinalist
revolution in Anglo-American economics, founded an important part of his case on the
66

For a very helpful introduction to the ambitions and method of logical positivism, see A.J. Ayer, Editor’s
Introduction in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 3-28 (A.J. Ayer, ed.) (1959). Like nearly any school or body of
thought, logical positivism encompassed a variety of inflections and emphases around its core
commitments.
67
See id. at 17-23 (emphasizing the logical positivist mistrust of claiming truth, verifiability, or
falsifiability for statements about value or about the mental states of others).
68
See id. at 21-23.
69
See id. at 17-21.
70
See id. at 17 (“There could be no question of our literally sharing one another’s sense-data, any more
than we can literally share one another’s thoughts or images or feelings”).

27

impossibility of knowing the utility levels of others.71 Robbins’s motivation was to
purify economics as a positive science by purging it of knowledge-claims that could not
pass the Logical Positivist bar.72 Although an ordinalist approach to economics had
found earlier adherent in England, and on similar philosophical ground, and likewise on
the Continent, Robbins’s arguments were decisive in the ordinalist triumph in AngloAmerican economics.73 This was particularly pressing because much of English
economics into the 1930s was classically utilitarian; that is, it sought to advise
policymakers on the best means of maximizing the utility of the nation, summed across
persons.74 Such an effort necessarily involves hypotheses about the relative utility of
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different persons, which English utilitarianism accomplished chiefly through the
assumption of declining marginal utility, that is, that with increasing wealth, the gain in
utility from each new sum is less than at lower levels of wealth.75 But the claim to know
that one person is experiencing a greater level of satisfaction than another concerns the
subjective experience of another – a cardinal instance of wishful thinking or idle
speculation masquerading as a claim to truth. Mixing such speculation with economic
science was like mixing morality with mathematics.
Robbins made precisely this argument in his famous Essay on the Nature and
Significance of Economic Science,76 where he launched his argument against the thenprevalent English fusion of utilitarian ethics and economic analysis:

and ambitions of the “material welfare school” of English economics). It is abundantly clear that the
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Now, of course, in daily life we do continually assume that the [interpersonal]
comparisons can be made. But the very diversity of the assumptions actually
made at different times and in different places is evidence of their conventional
nature. In Western democracies we assume for certain purposes that men in
similar circumstances are capable of equal satisfactions. Just as for purposes of
justice we assume equality of responsibility in similar situations as between legal
subjects, so for purposes of public finance we agree to assume equality of
capacity for experiencing satisfaction from equal incomes in similar
circumstances as between economic subjects. But although it may be convenient
to assume this, there is no way of proving that the assumption rests on
ascertainable fact. And, indeed, if the representative of some other civilization
were to assure us that we were wrong, that members of his caste (or his race) were
capable of experiencing ten times as much satisfaction from given incomes as
members of an inferior caste (or an “inferior” race), we could not refute him. We
might poke fun at him. We might flare up with indignation, and say that his
valuation was hateful, that it led to civil strife, unhappiness, unjust privilege, and
so on and so forth. But we could not show that he wrong in any objective sense,
more than we could show that we were right.77
In an essay a few years later, Robbins again used the example of cultural variation
in assumptions about utility, evoking a Brahmin who purports to be capable of ten times
as much happiness as an untouchable. He concluded,

I had no sympathy with the Brahmin. But I could not escape the conviction that,
if I chose to regard men as equally capable of satisfaction and he to regard them
as differing according to a hierarchical schedule, the difference between us was
not one that could be resolved by the same methods as were available in other
fields of social judgment.78
In Robbins’s telling, the problem of other minds not only scuttles the specific
claim that people experience equal utility under like circumstances: it makes untenable
any interpersonal comparison of utilities. This is so because claims about the utility of
others are neither falsifiable nor verifiable: in the face of disagreement, arguers can have
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no recourse to facts; they can only reiterate their judgments more emphatically. As
Robbins wrote, they can “flare up,” call the opposing view “hateful,” or claim that
holding it will have undesirable results for the social world; but they cannot show that it
is false, any more than the opponent can show that it is true. Such a claim has no place in
a scientific method of social inquiry.79
The essential connection between Robbins’s conclusion and the method of
contemporary economics is that the ordinalist account of rationality and utility can
provide a model of decision-making that avoids any claim to compare the utility of
various persons. Instead, the microeconomic model that Robbins helped to inaugurate
avoided any claims to observe or make substantive inferences about the mental states of
others. Instead it assumes that (1) individuals have introspective knowledge of their own
preferences, so they are able to evaluate choices according to the levels of satisfaction
they will bring about for them; (2) the decisions they make, which are objectively
observable, will be consistent with, and thus reveal, their preferences; and (3) the
observed pattern of decisions will consequently be utility-maximizing for each person.
Note that these claims allow no inference about whether one person’s utility in a given
state of affairs is greater or less than another person’s in the same (or, for that matter, a
different) state of affairs. The only kinds of knowledge this approach requires – or
permits – are introspective and externally observable, which it bridges by means of the
79
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assumption that introspective knowledge of one’s own utility function translates into
objectively observable decisions.
It should be evident that this version of economic method has at least an elective
affinity with non-utilitarian modes of welfare economics, particularly Pareto’s conception
of efficiency, which requires only non-interference with individual utility levels, and
includes no notion of aggregating utility, which would require an interpersonal metric of
utility.80 My interest here, though, is in a different point: the connection between an
economic method that avoids the problem of other minds and the general conception of
scientific social inquiry that arose with logical positivism and took on board its
conception of what could constitute knowledge. The microeconomic model of decisionmaking that I have just sketched built into its premises the sort of epistemic chastity that
this model of social inquiry celebrated, and thus provided a tool-kit well adapted to the
formulation of decorous questions and chaste answers.
In a fine polemical statement of this methodological ambition, the logical
positivist Otto Neurath declared that social inquiry must be subject to the same standard
as any other inquiry: creating a unified set of generalizations “equal to the task of serving,
as often as possible, to predict individual events or certain groups of events.”81 A method
of social inquiry geared to these criteria must contain no meaningless statements, which
would at best obscure and, far more often, outright confuse the inquiry. Neurath
characterized any claim to knowledge of the self-understanding of others as meaningless
in this sense, that is, not subject to objective assessment and thus adding other confusion
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or nothing at all. Methods that claimed a place for “empathy” or “understanding” of the
motives or ideas on which people act came in for special scorn.82 Like claims about the
utility of others, or ethical statements, claims resting on “empathy” or “understanding”
could be neither verified nor falsified, because they did not refer to a realm of phenomena
to which inquirers had access. They might chance to be true, as claims about the utility
of others or about the nature of God might chance to be true; but there was no building a
science out of such shots in the dark. All social inquiry must be behaviorist, that is,
concerned only with the observable activity of individuals and groups.
Readers will recognize the connection between Neurath’s methodological polemic
and the famous later claim of Karl Popper, himself deeply influenced by logical
positivism, that social inquiry must produce falsifiable predictions or else be subject to
endless and epistemically fruitless manipulation.83 They will also recognize the
connection with the economics-influenced model of social explanation familiar from law
and economics, rational-choice theory, and economically influenced sociology: a simple
model of individual decision-making, involving no claims about the mental states of
others, which produces testable hypotheses about the behavior of individuals and
institutions given certain circumstances.

B. The Interpretivist Response
The positivist model of social explanation has not overwhelmed all alternatives.
Instead, it has produced a schism in social inquiry between positivists and interpretivists,
who maintain what Neurath rejected: that an adequate account of human activity requires
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attention to the self-understanding of others. The most rigorous and articulate exponent
of this view is the philosopher and law professor Charles Taylor. In a decades-long series
of arguments, Taylor has developed a position that may be stated in the following
propositions. (1) Human beings are self-conscious animals, aware of making decisions
from among alternatives.84 (2) We experience ourselves as making these decisions not
willy-nilly, but for reasons: for instance, we choose an action because we think it is right,
or better than the alternative, or more dignified, or more consistent with who we think we
are; we avoid or regret an action that we regard as wrong, worse, asinine, or out of
character (unless we think our character needs amending!).85 (3) Consequently, we
always act under descriptions or interpretations of our actions and the context in which
they take place. Our lives never present themselves to us as raw fact, but always as
interpreted activity.86 (4) These descriptions are not idiosyncratic, but deeply shaped by
shared ideas about human beings, the social world, and the natural world. It is only
shared understandings of this sort that make certain objective actions into “performing
mime theater,” “hitting on someone,” “coming out of the closet,” “negotiating a
contract,” or “being a Trappist Monk.”87 Try performing mime or coming out of the
closet in, say, Homeric Greece, and you will (or would, if the experiment were literally
possible) be lucky to get away with merely the kind of mutual incomprehension and
irritation that Robbins envisioned with his hypothetical Brahmin. (5) As the last point
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indicates, shared understandings differ across time and place. Actions that are altogether
intelligible in one setting, even regarded as essentially human there (such as striking a
contract or publicly acknowledging one’s sexuality), will not make sense in another
setting. Indeed, for most people in that second setting, even the idea of the action may be
inaccessible: can we really know what it meant to be one of the medieval Christians who
sent their young to Jerusalem in the Children’s Crusade? (6) Consequently, there is a
relevant sense in which people, unlike any other object of inquiry, do not obey the same
rules across time and space. They will react differently to the same external stimuli,
because those stimuli will have different meaning for them, depending who they are.88
Of course, they will display behavioral regularities within a cultural practice that they
belong to, for that is what makes a cultural practice; but to explain what they are doing,
you will need reference to the practice and the shared understandings that make it
intelligible to its participants.89 If you try to abstract from those considerations, you will
get two results. First is an account that presents correlations between stimuli and
behavior without reference to the underpinnings of the activity, which are not simply
physical facts, but also self-understandings shaped by participation in shared
interpretations.90 Of course, you may be willing to jettison self-understandings, as long
as physical facts suffice to fill out the correlations. But then the problem is the second
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feature of the result: an account whose validity stops at the border of the practice in
which the correlation occurs, whether in time or in space.91
Let us say, then, that you want to answer a social question with real stakes: Why
did nationalist and fascist ideologies display wide appeal in the twentieth century?
Correlatively, how can we tell whether, and if so where, such ideologies present a threat
to freedom and tolerance today? Taylor’s argument implies that trying to answer such a
question by reference solely to objective facts – the incentives the constitutional structure
give to politicians, the trajectory of the national economy, the historical proximity of
military defeat or colonial domination – will not take us as far as we should want to go.
The same logic applies to another urgent contemporary question: Why do certain
populations produce suicide bombers while others – also poor, on the losing end of recent
history, and beset by intractable political orders – do not? In providing such explanations
and predictions, Taylor suggests that we will want to supplement our positivism, at least,
with an attempt to understand how the ideological appeal of fascism or martyrdom offers
a new collective understanding – of national identity, for instance, and of the nation’s
history – and recruits followers into it. That is, we will want to make a trip to the heart of
shared understandings, of “empathy,” in Neurath’s dismissive term.
The difficulty is that, even though the positivist program is unsatisfactory, its
criticism of the interpretive mode is potent. That the minds of others are not directly
available to us is not a niggling point, but a basic impediment to judging whether any
particular inquiry is elucidating or obscuring the object of study. In beginning an
interpretive inquiry, one must make methodological choices, and those involve
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presuppositions about the content of other minds. The method may be psychoanalytic,
seeking the sources of violent ideologies in suppressed anger and distorted sexual
desire.92 It may be Marxist, involving claims about the relationship of ideology to
economic position.93 It may, in the manner of Taylor himself, simply an attempt to give a
rich description of the shared understandings that arise and are articulated around
particular political movements.94 Or, taking a cue from Tocqueville, it may put
substantial trust in the acuity and synthetic power of the observer, inviting her to put
together a story about ideological motivation out of disparate observations and
interpretive intuitions.95
How, then, to say which approach is helpful and which misleading? There is no
fully satisfactory answer. Each of these approaches can purport to interpret a given
episode consistent with its methodological commitments. Moreover, the predictions they
issue will tend to incorporate those commitments so as to be non-falsifiable: for instance,
“I predict that violent ideologies will have appeal to populations where suppression of
anger and shame at sexuality result in sado-masochistic impulses directed at out-groups.”
That may well be right; but the statement does not come in testable form. The non-
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appearance of violent ideologies will simply be evidence of the relative weakness of
sado-masochism in politics. To know more, we would have to do what we cannot: have
access to the mental states of others, to “see” the descriptions under which they reason
and act.
This is the origin of the wish that neuroeconomics addresses: the wish to see other
minds, and so to heal the rift in social inquiry, restricting ourselves to observable
phenomena while acknowledging the importance of the descriptions under which people
act. In the next part of this essay, I treat the promise and the limits of the answer
neuroeconomics gives to this wish.

III.

Three Problems for Neuroeconomics
A. Collective Action: Reciprocity, Rationality, or rationality?

1. Collective-action Problems
Legal and public-policy analysis have given attention for decades to “collectiveaction problems.” The structure of the problems is that individuals acting on the
neoclassical model of rationality will find it in their interest not to contribute to
arrangements that benefit the group overall. Canonical examples include the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, where each player’s pursuit of a dominant (always rationally preferred)
strategy yields a sub-optimal outcome; the Voter Paradox, where each individual’s good
reason not to participate in a collective practice causes the practice to break down; and
the Tragedy of the Commons, where individual pursuit of maximum gain from a common
resource results in exhaustion of the resource.
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As Amartya Sen has phrased the matter helpfully – albeit at a characteristically
high level of abstraction – in a way that captures its two-sided implications: “Gametheoretic analyses have contributed to a better understanding of some of the difficulties
that the concept of ‘rationality’ must face and have clarified the nature of some problems
that social organization must deal with.”96 Put differently, collective-action problems
may present at least two kinds of difficulty for social practices and institutions. First,
they may present prudential problems: it might be unwise to introduce or maintain a
resource-governance regime with the structure of a commons tragedy. Second,
collective-action problems may present a theoretical difficulty: if it is true that actions
contributing to social optimality are individually irrational, those who seek to understand
social practices and institutions may have to revise their understanding of their topic.
Here, however, the other side of collective-action problems enters. It would be a basic
mistake to imagine that once a theoretical account of rationality has “proven” the
“irrationality” of a practice that is in fact widespread, such as voting, theorists and voters
alike must either give up the practice or go in search of “non-rational” explanations. In
the natural sciences, observed data is decisive: a result inconsistent with a theory falsifies
the theory. In theoretical social inquiry, we owe facts at least the decency to contemplate
that their persistence might suggest a problem in a theory that purports to debunk them.
The situation calls for a middle way, which neither fetishizes existing practices
nor hypostasizes a particular conception of rationality. Responses have taken many
tacks, from Robert Axelrod’s argument that reiterated games produce reciprocity among
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self-interested individuals97 to Carol Rose’s contention that a plurality of motives is
necessary to explain the emergence of cooperative practices98 to James Acheson’s studies
of actually existing common resources and the management practices that accompany
them.99 Here I concentrate on two, Dan Kahan’s proposal that reciprocity is at least as
motivationally important as self-interest narrowly understood, and Richard Tuck’s
argument (developing some themes of Sen’s) that a conception of rationality that
emphasizes agency over welfare would move us nearer the experience of judgment and
choice.100

2. Reciprocity as Sympathy: Revising welfare
Kahan’s argument nicely summarizes a strong version of the sorts of behavioral
economics inquiries sketched in Part I in connection with neuroimaging experiments. He
assets that according to “the reciprocity theory” of motivation to collective action, (1)
“Most people think of themselves and want to be understood by others as cooperative and
trustworthy and are thus willing to contribute their fair share to securing collective goods.
By the same token, most individuals loathe being taken advantage of … if they perceive
that most other individuals are shirking, they too hold back to avoid feeling (or being)
exploited.”101 (2) Either reciprocity or non-reciprocity can characterize a social state:
“there is no ‘dominant’ strategy … interdependencies [of reciprocity-based motivation]
tend to generate patterns of collective behavior characterized by multiple equilibria
97
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punctuated by tipping points” between reciprocal and non-reciprocal equilibria.102 (3) In
light of (1) and (2), policymakers should seek to promote contribution to collective goods
not just by creating positive economic incentives, but also by promoting trust, leading
people to believe that others will contribute, and thus to contribute themselves, in the
virtuous circle of a high-reciprocity equilibrium.103 Moreover (4), individual motivation
to reciprocate or withhold contributions both varies across individuals at any time and
varies with dynamic interactions between individuals’ present motives and what they
perceive to be the motives and actions of relevant others.104
How should we understand Kahan’s “reciprocity view”? Just what kind of
modification does it propose to the conventional understanding of collective-action
problems? The unifying idea of the proposal is that people’s motivations are neither as
fixed nor as self-regarding as neoclassical accounts would have it. Such a modification,
however, may tell in any of several different respects, as Sen outlines a discussion of
“several quite distinct components of ‘privateness’ in the concept of persons used in
standard economic theory.”105 Conventional economic analysis on Sen’s account takes
on board three aspects of “motivation,” to use Kahan’s term, and interprets each in a
“private” way, to use Sen’s word. First, on the level of welfare, it assumes that a
person’s “welfare depends only on his or her own consumption (and in particular, it does
not involve any sympathy or antipathy toward others).106 Second, on the level of goals, it
assumes that “[a] person’s only goal is to maximize his or her own welfare … (and in
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particular, it does not involve directly attaching importance to the welfare of others).”107
Third, on the level of decision or action, “[e]ach act of choice of a person is guided
immediately by the pursuit of one’s own goal (and, in particular, it is not restrained by the
recognition of other people’s pursuit of their goals).”108
Kahan’s proposal operates on the first level, contending that reciprocity plays a
major role in constituting welfare, or utility. It would be possible to reverse-engineer the
formulation, positing that welfare is function of satisfied preferences or achieved goals,
and thus that reciprocity must be one’s goal; and that preferences in turn are read from
choices (“revealed preferences”); but this would be artificial. The claim is that most
people’s experience of welfare is interpersonally dependent: we feel good when others
treat us reciprocally and regard us as taking the same attitude toward them. This
interpretation thus involves no modification of conventional claim (2) or (3), which make
goals and choices functions of welfarew: those can proceed undisturbed once Kahan has
specified the substantive content of welfare. Kahan’s quarrel, then, is not with the formal
structure of rationality that undergirds the theory of collective-action failure, but with the
assumption that the source of the welfare that individuals seek to maximize excludes the
one quality that could make the collective-action problems self- solving: reciprocity itself.

3. Reciprocity as Agency: Revising “rationality”
In his discussion of collective-action problems, Sen proposes a different
modification, addressed less to the experience of welfare than to the character of agency.
Sen aptly identifies Kahan’s type of interdependent personal welfare as “sympathy,”
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which “refers to one person’s welfare being affected by the position of others,” meaning
here not their welfare, but their attitude of reciprocity or non-reciprocity.109 While
acknowledging the possibility of this modification, Sen evinces a great interest in what he
calls “commitment,” which involves conceiving of choice as founded not exclusively in
individual welfare (whether imagined as including or excluding sympathy), but also on
“identity,” or “our view of ourselves … the way we view our welfare, goals, or
behavioral obligations.”110 Sen’s objection to the model of rationality that generates
theoretical collective-action problems is that they are too scanty in their conception of
rationality: they undervalue the importance to choice of our capacity for self-scrutiny,
reflection, and context- spanning commitment.111 These processes of reasoning, in turn,
necessarily reflect the substance of the person’s identity, the groups or institutions or
traditions with which she aligns herself.112 The weight of Sen’s modification is not on
the weigh experience registers on the person as a source of welfare, but rather on what
satisfactions, commitments, principles, or other aspects of her identity the agent
reflectively affirms as reason for action. Choice is thus not a function of welfare, but the
independent fulcrum of reflective action, responsive to welfare, but reflectively and not
compulsorily so.
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One consequence of Sen’s account is that many different rankings of priorities,
including many different relative weightings of personal welfare, may be consistent with
rationality. Where the neoclassical model produces dominant strategies with suboptimal
consequences, Sen contends, there is simply nothing authoritative about the account of
rationality that generates those strategies. It is just as cogent to say that one rationally
chooses not to defect from a collective enterprise because of the value one places on
one’s own future well-being, the aggregate long-term well-being of those who share in
the enterprise (such as other citizens), or the principles the enterprise seeks to bring about
(for example, general prosperity or political liberty).113 It may be a stretch to insist that
such considerations are all constituents of “welfare,” unless the move is purely axiomatic,
i.e., whatever prefer we reveal by choice must be welfare-maximizing. It is not, however,
a stretch to say that these are the considerations one has reflectively adopted and pursued.
This way of putting the argument may seem miss the force of collective-action
problems. It is all very well to say that people prefer states of the world in which joint
enterprises can flourish and the right principles (that is, the principles these people
reflectively endorse) govern. But why not, at any moment, let other people do the work,
or take a little extra for oneself? And if any one person should be susceptible to that
temptation, why not everyone? And so forth down the familiar path until we are all nonvoters imprisoned for medium-length terms amidst pastures exhausted by overgrazing.
Sen does not fully develop an answer, but his response contains the cornerstones
of two lines of argument. One is that identification with a relevant group of others means
accepting certain rules of conduct toward others, and not engaging in relentless
113
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calculation toward self-interested maximization.114 Self-interest bounded by such rules
is, of course, entirely ordinary; but self-interested calculation that persistently disregards
such rules includes a failure or refusal to identify with others.115 To say that rationality
includes the substantive commitments generated by interpersonal and group
identification, then, is to say that it includes a valuation of shared rules as things to be
obeyed.
A second line of argument is more thinly developed in Sen, but provocative
nonetheless. This has to do with the relationship between agency and identity. As Sen
stresses, “’We’ demand things; ‘our’ actions reflect ‘our’ concerns; ‘we’ protest at
injustice done to ‘us.’’116 That is, in speech and writing people habitually ascribe agency
to collectives with which they identify. Although that form of speech might be mere
rhetorical license, it also might indicate something about the experience of agency. If I
vote the winning candidate in a presidential campaign where I care strongly about the
outcome, and the candidate wins by more than one vote, do I experience myself as having
committed a superfluous act of no significance, or as having a share in bringing about a
victory? Introspection suggests that the answer is the latter, and that having no such
experience – feeling the act of voting was entirely inefficacious – would indicate that one
had already disidentified from the partisan or civic identity that made sense of the act of
voting. Moreover, reflection suggests that the experience of agency in such collective
accomplishments is not the fraction of effort that one’s contribution made up, e.g., one
114
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forty-millionth part of a victory. Consider a winning baseball team. Although individual
contributions are relatively easy to tally in that sport, a player whose contribution was
“non-necessary” to the win in the sense that it did not provide the margin of victory
would be confused, maybe even narcissistic, if he decided the win therefore had nothing
to do with his participation. Moreover, each player’s experience of achievement would
not one-ninth of some sum of achievement, ascribed to a collective agent called “the
team.” There is no such sum. The experience of agency occurs only in individuals, and
each individual has the experience expressed in “we won,” an experience that is possible
only because of each individual’s identification with the team.
On this account, then, an act of voting would be an act of agency dependent on
identification with the party, movement, or principles of the candidate. A victory means
that the voter’s experience is “we won,” an undivided experience of achievement that by
its nature belongs to each voter who contributed. The intensity of the experience will
vary with the magnitude of the achievement (whether the race was hard-fought, how deep
and consequential the difference of principle was) and the level of the voter’s
identification with the party, movement, or principle. It will not vary with whether the
voter’s contribution provided the margin of victory, nor will it be divided by the number
of contributing voters. Such restrictions are in the nature of purely self-regarding agency,
but not in the nature of agency premised on identification with a collective.

4. The Question for Neuroeconomics
This discussion leaves us with several alternative accounts of why neoclassical
models of rationality frequently fail to predict the outcomes of collective-action
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problems. One, Kahan’s is based on the satisfaction people take in viewing themselves
and others as reciprocators and in activity that confirms that view. Another, the first of
Sen’s alternatives, is that group identification produces loyalty to common rules of
conduct, and that loyalty to these is part of the nature of group membership. A third is
that group identification changes the experience of agency, producing an experience of
undivided achievement based in accomplishments conventionally ascribed to the group.
Of course, these accounts need not be mutually exclusive. It is possible that one,
two, all, or none of them is right, and likely that they account for different degrees of
motivation across persons, contexts, and time. Neuroimaging in prisoners’ dilemma-type
games, as discussed above, hints that when the decisionmaker experiences reciprocity or
non-reciprocity with another concrete person (not necessarily visible, but believed to be
the source of decisions), some kind of spontaneous experience of welfare follows.
Ultimatum game results suggest a corresponding experience of bad feeling and impulse
to resist or punish upon the experience of non-reciprocal behavior linked to another
concrete person. These data, however, do not take us very far, even if we accept that
reciprocity with concrete others is motivated in the manner just sketched. We would still
know nothing about which account best explains voting: an experience of agency
mediated through identification with a collective; an extension of the welfare-enhancing
experience of reciprocity to an impersonal scale based on the impression that others are
also contributing (voting); or respect for settled rules of conduct that are implied by
membership in a collective. Moreover, as the lure of voting clearly exercises different
relative force on different people, there is no reason not to believe that each of these
motives comes into play sometimes, in some contexts, in some persons.
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To the extent that some of these motives are the social-emotional ones whose
neural correlates have been observed in reciprocity games, their presence in other
contexts might be observable. To the extent that the successful exercise of agency has
neural correlates, the role of this experience in contributions to collective enterprises
would also be open to investigation. As for rules of conduct implied by group
identification, it would be possible to investigate whether these display the same
correlates as utilitarian principles, when unproblematic and when under pressure from
emotionally laden motives. If so, it might be possible to discern when such principles are
in play in reasoning about collective action, and how powerful they are.

B. Commodification: Is there a there there?
1. The Anti-commodification case
A persistent problem for legal theory is the claim that commodification drains
experience of moral richness and complexity. Commodification refers to governing a
resource under the principles of market property, that is, allowing ownership of it with
the incident of alienation, so that it becomes an object of market logic. Above all, as a
market commodity the resource is fungible with other commodities, meaning that at any
time its owner can convert it to cash, and consequently to its cash equivalent in a bundle
of other goods. This metric of value is the main object of the anti-commodification
complaint. The charge goes that valuing something in terms of its cash equivalent is
inconsistent with valuing it for other qualities, such as beauty, personal attachment, or
association with spiritual or cultural traditions. Moreover, according to critics of
commodification, market valuation tends to overwhelm or crowd out other forms of
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valuation, so that once something is commodified, those who once valued it for more
elusive qualities will learn in time to value it for its cash equivalent. A fully
commodified world, the argument implies, would be on all points subject to the
curmudgeon’s complaint about the cynic: that he knows the price of everything, but the
value of nothing. Critics have directed variants of the argument at the use of markets for
environmental regulation, the sale of organs, and proposals for markets in adopted
children. Although there are still stylized debates over commodification’s good or bad
qualities in general, Margaret Jane Radin, who substantially introduced commodification
concerns to the American legal academy, has developed a much more nuanced view,
arguing that many domains are properly governed by market-style rights and regimes, but
that goods connected with important or subtle forms of qualitative value, such as
sexuality, should not be.117
There is quite a straightforward response to the complaint against
commodification: Not so! One can simply deny that there is any inconsistency between
valuing things for their qualitative properties and putting a price on them. After all, does
the price not reflect our qualitative appreciation of the thing? If parents paid a market
rate to adopt a child, it would presumably be because they were moved by all the usual
parental motivations. And doesn’t the price of beautiful homes or beautiful clothes
reflect (in addition, perhaps, to their status value) potential buyers’ appreciation of their
beauty?
Even if one accepted that the two metrics of value are in some meaningful sense
incompatible, rather than believe commodity value is derivative of qualitative value, that
117

See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN
BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 1-15, 79-101 (1996) (laying out the argument that commodification can
have bad consequences for moral, emotional, and social life).

49

would not imply that commodity value ineluctably overwhelms more qualitative forms of
value. It would still be perfectly possible in principle that the two could co-exist. This is
a weaker version of not so, but nonetheless a variant of the same answer.
There is also an affirmative response to the anti-commodification charge. On this
account, commodifying things is not just neutral in its effect on their valuation; rather, it
is a way of designating them as mattering and thus of increasing or accentuating their
“qualitative” value. This argument has two versions, varying usually with the resource at
issue. For non-human resources, such as environmental goods, the suggestion is that,
whatever pious noises people may make, in practice when things have no price, we tend
to treat them not as priceless but as worthless. To say that one must pay for emitting air
pollution, therefore, does not imply that the atmosphere is a “mere commodity”; rather, it
carries the message that the atmosphere is worth something.
The second version of the affirmative response concerns commodification of
aspects of human beings, particularly their time and labor power, but also organs,
reproductive capacity, sexuality, and any other quality that another might seek to
purchase or rent. The argument, which arose in the debate over commodification of
labor, is that by (1) enabling people to exchange for market value what they previously
could not, commodification increases their options and thus their effective freedom and
(2) by creating a legally enforceable right to refuse to exchange these aspects of one’s
self, commodification defines a boundary of legal identity that reinforces autonomy and
dignity.118

118
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2. The failure of inquiry and the question for neuroeconomics
Serious inquiry into the issue of commodification has all but ended. A good part
of the reason, I suggest, is that commodification presents a classic other-minds problem.
Take it as true that Margaret Radin experiences commodification as draining its objects
of their other dimensions of value. That tells us nothing about Richard Posner, or
anybody else, would respond to the same act of commodification. To make the point
more abstractly and precisely: the prediction of the anti-commodification position is
observationally indistinguishable from its contrary, so positive inquiry can tell us
nothing. Describe a labor market: at the end of the description, you will have added
nothing to our knowledge of whether participation in such a market degrades, ennobles,
or merely allocates efficiently the act of labor. Describe a market in environmental
pollution credits: the same discouraging proviso applies. Positive inquiry is in this
respect restricted to regarding people as black boxes. When the question concerns the
experience of value – not the choice that follows, but the qualities at play in the judgment
that generates the choice – epistemic chastity toward other minds turns out to be a
chastity belt.
Here neuroimaging has some promise of suggesting certain initial cuts, in a
phrase, whether there is a there in commodification theory. The image of reasoning
suggested by commodification theorists is very much like that evoked by neuroimaging
results in the ultimatum game and moral reasoning exercises: struggle between a
cognitively operational principle – here, maximizing commodity value – and a less

produced increasingly reciprocal relationships and reduced the indignity and degradation of status-based
labor obligations).
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cognitive response such as aesthetic appreciation, reverence, or love, which arrives in
consciousness as a direct perception, rather than being mediated by conscious application
of a principle. It is possible, of course, that this description misapprehends the anticommodification charge, and that the claim is instead that viewing things in terms of their
maximum commodity value becomes as “pre-cognitive” as beauty or pain; but suppose
otherwise for the moment. If there is anything to this, then we might hypothesize that
judgments involving trading off, say, money against beautiful landscapes or time with
intimates would correlated with pattern of brain activity like those of the ultimatum game
and moral-reasoning dilemmas. Such a finding would lend credence to the idea that these
tradeoffs involve essentially different kinds of valuation. Tracking parallel tradeoffs in
ways designed to capture degrees of commodification would then suggest something
about the substance – or the emptiness – of commodification theory.

C. Authoritarianism: The highest stakes and the otherest minds
1. The positivist problem
Among the most consequential questions one might want social inquiry to address
is why authoritarian politics succeeds or fails. 119 Authoritarian movements and
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governments have been the bane of democracies throughout the twentieth century, from
Nazism to today’s radical Hindu and Islamist politics: wherever they come to power
through elections or attract popular support, they suggest that democracy may be selfimmolating, at least under certain circumstances. Since Theodor Adorno and his
collaborators began trying to understand varying individual attraction to fascism in Nazi
Germany, students of authoritarian disposition have broadly agreed on the political
attitudes whose origins they seek to understand: “suppression of [moral, cultural, and/or
racial] difference and insistence upon uniformity,” expressed in politics through
“autocratic social arrangements in which individual autonomy yields to group
authority.”120 These attitudes characterized fascist and nationalist movements in the early
and middle decades of the twentieth century, and they characterize today’s forms of
extremism as well. Understanding why such politics appeals to some and repels others
would be a momentous achievement.
Yet the problem has not inspired methodological lucidity. Instead, several
persistent difficulties led to the eclipse of the study of authoritarian disposition. First was
a confusion of independent and dependent variables. Researchers confounded the
hypothetical object of the study – a disposition to authoritarian appeals – with its
expression, adherence to authoritarian political beliefs.121 Identifying bearers of

UNDERSTANDING RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM (1988). Others have stayed with the idea of strong
predispositions, but looked to biological rather than social bases for these. See C.S. Bergeman, et al.,
Genetic and Environmental Effects on Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness: An
Adoption/Twin Study,” 61 J. OF PERSONALITY 159 (1993).
120
See id. at 15. Stenner elsewhere elaborates on her findings in connection with this model:
“authoritarians proved to be greatly alarmed by departures from moral and cultural absolutism, by any
deviation from unquestioning conformity to external authority. And most characteristic of all, they
invariably looked first to leaders and institutions to reinstate and reinforce the normative order, seeking to
marshal the authority of the state to ‘institute’ the maintenance of ‘civility’ and ‘hold up our moral
values[.]’ Id. at 267.
121
See STENNER, supra n. __ at 20-23 (outlining this problem).
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authoritarian disposition by their expression of authoritarian beliefs collapsed the
distinction and left a circular definition of the authoritarian disposition: that disposition
evidenced by expression of the same authoritarian beliefs the disposition was meant to
explain.122 Second was a related conceptual failure: the conflation of “authoritarian”
attitudes with the political program of “right-wing” parties in the home countries of the
investigators, so that “authoritarianism” was run together with other, local elements of
right-wing politics, such as the conservative distaste for change in general and the
libertarian preference for free markets over redistribution and economic regulation.123
Third, theorists have mostly lacked any account of when the hypothetical disposition
produces actual adherence to authoritarian politics and when it lies dormant.124
Stenner’s response is to isolate a definition of “authoritarian” disposition that is
distinct from conservative and libertarian outlooks and does not depend on the same
political attitudes that it is supposed to predict. Moreover, she offers a testable theory of
why the authoritarian disposition sometimes finds expression in intolerant political
attitudes and sometimes lies dormant. Stenner defines the authoritarian disposition as
“some general desire … to transfer sovereignty to, and commit self and others to
conformity with some collective order,” connected to a deep-set belief that the security
and trustworthiness of the social world depend on “collective authority and conformity …
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oneness and sameness.”125 She hypothesizes that this disposition finds expression under
circumstances of “normative threat,” when the “collective order” is threatened by
conflicting values, “moral decay,” or evidence that political leaders are unreliable.126
Thus under conditions of apparent stability and moral consensus, authoritarians’ views
may not differ much from those of others. When events present “normative threat,”
however, authoritarians will respond with more conformist and punitive positions than
non-authoritarians, and will make it a high political priority to rebuild stable and
trustworthy authority.127 By contrast, libertarians are much less likely to express
increasingly authoritarian views even under conditions of normative threat.128
Conservatives, while resistant to change and often hostile to dissensus, tend to mistrust
the programs that distinguish authoritarian politics: efforts to reconstitute authority in the
face of perceived breakdown, a strategy which many forms of nationalism and fascism
exemplify.129
Methodologically, Stenner measures authoritarian disposition through questions
designed to probe childrearing values. She asks respondents to rank as more important
one of a pair of qualities that parents might to inculcate in their children.130 The pairings
present alternatives such as “[the child] follows the rules” or “he follows his own
conscience,” and “he has respect for his elders” or “he thinks for himself.”131 Stenner
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proposes that these questions elicit basic orientations toward the relative value and
importance of authority and uniformity versus autonomy and diversity. Because
childrearing is a personal and high-stakes activity, she believes the answers should
capture genuine, deep-set attitudes.132 Stenner has found that high scores on her
childrearing-based authoritarianism index correspond to heightened levels of
authoritarian attitudes under conditions of normative threat, suggesting that the index
captures the disposition she hypothesizes.133

2. The persistence of interpretation
It is critical to Stenner’s methodological contribution that she treats her index of
childrearing values as an independent variable. Although this is a promising move as a
matter of social-science methodology, it does not dispel the problems that dog
authoritarian studies. The aim in specifying the independent variable is to pick out some
feature of personality that precedes politics and thus can explain why people with that
personality adopt one political attitude rather than another. The difficulty is that, as the
interpretivist position proposes, expressions of personality are always inflected through
culturally specific worldviews. Thus, normative conceptions of the family and the adult
personality that childrearing should produce are hardly more fixed or pre-political than
more traditionally political attitudes. Rather, they are the products of constant interaction
between ideological and material contests: on the one hand, ideas about the good or just
132

See id. at 24-25. It strikes me as a fair concern that there is indeed a politics of parenting, and people’s
ideological and partisan affiliations may well influence their announced priorities in raising children. A
glance at the cultural politics of the Christian Right in the United States will confirm this point. That said,
however, precisely because childrearing is intimate and has substantial and immediate consequences,
Stenner’s judgment that it provides a relatively independent clue to basic orientations is plausible.
Moreover, her findings upon testing the theory are impressive.
133
See id. at 199-268 (detailing findings of Stenner’s research).

56

family and the good or dignified person;134 on the other hand, the control of resources
that structures the “cooperative competition” within families and thus contributes to each
succeeding generation’s idea of what families actually are and normatively should be.135
Moreover, ideas of the family are frequently part of explicitly political disputes and the
partisan identity of citizens. One need reach no further for evidence than the choice of
“family values” as a rallying point for cultural conservatives in the United States; the
response that “hate is not a family value”; and the political charge of disputes over samesex marriage.136
Moreover, family structure seems to work in a dynamic relationship with other
values. For instance, research in India has found that the survival rates of female children
go up considerably relative to male children when mothers become literate and enter the
workforce.137 Amartya Sen has argued that families become more gender-egalitarian as
women increase both their bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands and their ideas of
what the world might hold for them.138 Such changes have at least three, interdependent
elements: (1) political decisions to encourage women’s education and access to labor
markets; (2) women’s assertion of enhanced agency in the family after taking advantage
of these changes; and (3) changing normative ideas of the family, specifically an
increasingly egalitarian view of sons and daughters. Intuitively, these changes should be
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mutually reinforcing, as each would tend to support the others. While this example does
not speak to authoritarianism as such, it does instance the interaction of political and
childrearing attitudes beyond cases, such as “family values,” in which family structure is
explicitly politicized.
None of this is to deny that Stenner proposes an enriched set of correlations
among attitudes that may reveal much about the interaction of ideas about authority,
order, and the threat of disorder at different levels of social structure, politics and the
family. Moreover, homologies between attitudes toward family and toward politics add
credence to the belief in some invariant need for order and authority and mistrust of
plurality and uncertainty, which might indeed be called a “personality.” Nonetheless, the
concept of personality or disposition is no more than a metaphor for a constellation of
attitudes that all occur on the same level of expression: participation in already
interpreted world of cultural and political values. Moreover, on this evidence it may or
may not be a misleading metaphor, suggesting an essential core of social-psychological
potential that moves with a person throughout her life, exhibiting itself subtly in
childrearing attitudes and now and again erupting into politics when “normative threat”
awakes it.

3. The Question for Neuroeconomics
What would be genuinely new in this area would be to generate neuroimaging
correlates for the key experiences in Stenner’s model: encountering unwelcome evidence
of cultural and ideological diversity, such as gay or interracial couples; facing instances
of individuality-oriented childrearing; perceiving political leaders and other emblems of
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authority besmirched or shamed, as during Richard Nixon’s last years in office or Bill
Clinton’s period of sexual scandal. Stenner hypothesizes that these experiences trigger
the same, or a closely related, sense of threat. We know a little about the neurological
correlates of threat, and particularly the primitive sense of threat presented by a confusing
and alarming problem that defies our mastery – such as uncertainty about the odds of a
gamble, to take a particularly bloodless example. Neuroimagining could falsify or let
stand the hypothesis that a common experience of threat unites these events.
Moreover, neuroimaging might reveal something about the character of
susceptibility to authoritarian political appeals. If the hypothesis of a common threat
structure found some support in imaging, the next step would be to explore the correlates
of responsiveness to, let us say, videos of speeches by authoritarian leaders. (Although
there will inevitably be partisan carping, I would nominate Patrick J. Buchanan’s 1992
address to the Republican National Convention for American subjects.) What are the
neural correlates of response to such political appeals? Are they more intense in those
whose sense of threat has recently been engaged? And with what other attitudes and
responses are they correlated? Is the responsive brain region associated with relief,
aggression, higher reasoning? Do the correlates suggest a contest among regions of the
brain, as with difficult ethical problems, or an unchecked emotional reaction? How do
they differ from the correlates of, for instance, a participant in a structured exercise in
reasoned political deliberation?
Hypotheses about authoritarian personality or disposition rely, like Stenner’s, on
claims that a set of observable attitudes and responses expresses some underlying
orientation to the world, which might be identified independently of at least some of its
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expressions. Neuroimaging has the potential (1) to test the hypothesis that the pattern
reflects a unified underlying response and (2) to characterize the other emotions and
cognitive functions associated with that response, and to contrast it with other kinds of
political judgment.
As I stressed in discussing the interdependence of family and political attitudes,
one must put aside any idea that brain activity is somehow the foundation and one-way
cause of emotions and judgments, so that identifying the true underlying facts would
enable us to make confident generalization and predictions about the epiphenomena of
mind, culture, and politics. Neural correlates are just that, correlates, and the mental
experiences to which they correspond are the activity of self-interpreting human beings.
Nonetheless, patterns of correlation are facts that bridge some of the distance between
observer and observed, diminishing the importance of the problem of other minds.

IV.

Conclusion

How do people overcome collective-action problems? What do we value, and
does our valuation change along with legal and social institutions? Why do some
democratic citizens adopt authoritarian political attitudes while others resist them? It
would be hard to identify a more basic set of questions for social inquiry. The first
concerns the origins and persistence of social, political, and legal order. The second asks
into the basic purposes and principles that guide that order. The third addresses the most
elemental intrinsic threat to our liberal version of such order.
Each of these questions is at something of an impasse – particularly the second
two, which are foundering on the suspicion that no there is there. The impasse has its
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origins in the limitations of the main methodological alternatives in social inquiry.
Positivism takes seriously the inaccessibility of other minds and thus stops chastely short
of essential questions about the motivations of social phenomena. Interpretivism takes
seriously the importance of other minds, but produces non-falsifiable fabrics of
interpretation that depend, in the end, on the axioms one has selected to describe the inner
lives of human beings.
The tantalizing promise of neuroeconomics is to bridge the gap between the two
methods by rendering literally visible the activity of other minds. It will let us see reason,
fear, and principle at work, let us watch utility accumulate or dissipate.
The promise is not a mirage, but neither is it the whole world. Reflecting on the
three problems where I have suggested neuroeconomics can help overcome
methodological limitations reveals a point too basic to overcome. Sometimes
interpretation is an imperfect substitute for positive knowledge: when neuroimaging
reveals the place of primitive fear in aversion to uncertainty, we have learned something,
and can set aside certain interpretive alternatives. Sometimes, however, interpretation is
indispensable because the facts of human activity are constituted by interpretation:
individual and shared self-understandings, concerning both the nature of the world we
confront and the nature of the value it contains, that vary across persons and across
cultures. Knowledge of neural correlates can help to distinguish interpretations of
interpretations, ideas about what, exactly, is going on “in there”; but it cannot fruitfully
get interpretation out of the story by replacing it with a series of observable facts. Too
often, those facts comprise and are the correlates of shifting and contested interpretation.
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All of this strikes me as hopeful, even wonderful. Human experience is openended, in individual lives and in history, because we change as our self-understandings
change. Because we are self-aware and self-interpreting creatures, no objective
knowledge of our nature could ever reduce us to functions of neural events; those events
are reciprocally born of our cultural and mental lives. The new knowledge of
neuroeconomics does, however, promise to help us set aside some interpretive mistakes,
choose among interpretive alternatives, and add to our stock of positive facts. It may
make us less obscure to ourselves and to one another.
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